I. Introduction
Greater environmental awareness has altered our perceptions of economic activity in general and international trade in particular. Trade relations are now routinely scrutinized for their environmental implications, particularly when trading partners are at different levels of development. Most commonly, these considerations have arisen in the contexts of standards for multilateral trade agreements and secondary criteria for foreign direct investment and international lending. A vast analytical and empirical literature has arisen around these issues, and they have emerged as an important component of global policy dialogue (e.g., Anderson, 1992 Anderson, , 1996 Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1996; Low, 1992) .
This paper elucidates another environmental dimension of trade, one that is by no means new but upon which we cast new light. By looking at an old environmental problem in a new way, we hope to stimulate more constructive policy solutions. In particular, we propose a new collaborative basis for foreign direct investment (FDI) and official development assistance (ODA) that can confer greater benefits on both the origin and destination countries.
When exporters ship their goods abroad, they also ship an embodied environmental service, namely retention of the pollution caused by manufacturing their products.
Conversely, an importing country can defer domestic pollution to the exporter. Thus a dual perspective on trade flows emerges: every traded good corresponds to an embodied pollution service. As in the case of embodied factor services, this dualism opens up a large area for theoretical work on implicit and explicit environmental markets, resource, effluent, and environmental damage cost convergence, but this is not the focus of the present paper.
Using detailed trade statistics, we use this new perspective to examine the environmental implications of Japan's bilateral trade. Not surprisingly, significant asymmetries emerge in the pollution content of this country's imports and exports, particularly with respect to large natural resource/energy exporters. While this does not appear to be the result of any deliberate policy, Japanese consumption is much more pollution-intensive than its production, the main reason being imbalances in the effluent content of its imports and exports. Ultimately, then, Japanese consumers are contributing much more to global pollution than their environmental conditions at home would indicate.
While Japanese consumption (particularly intermediate use) patterns bear significant responsibility for these imbalances, so does the advanced state of the economy and its industry, and herein lies a means to redress bilateral pollution imbalances. Japan's developing-country trading partners generally have more pollution-intensive exports and domestic production for two reasons. Firstly, their economies are at an earlier stage of development, and primary and industrial activities represent a larger share of GDP than in OECD countries. Secondly, their technology is likely to be more pollution-intensive, and external markets are simply leveraging these environmentally inferior techniques to the detriment of everyone.
The more advanced countries generally, like Japan in the present discussion, can make an important contribution to global pollution levels and pollution inequality. They can do this by promoting economic development generally and technology transfer in particular. The former will inexorably shift the composition of GDP towards tertiary activities, while the latter will achieve flatter pollution trajectories for industrial expansion.
More importantly, the role advanced countries play in this process can be beneficial to themselves as well as to the emerging economies. Countries like Japan can promote technology transfer in both FDI and ODA policy, securing new markets for greener technologies while facilitating overseas development and new investment opportunities.
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In this way, redressing bilateral pollution imbalances becomes a collaborative, win-win basis for development and international lending/investment policy.
In Section II, we provide an overview of historical bilateral trade patterns for Japan. This information is then combined with pollution data to elucidate the underlying trade in pollution services. With this empirical information, Section III then discusses how Japan can more effectively coordinate its development assistance and foreign investment policies to achieve the dual objectives of economic expansion and environmental mitigation. Section IV is devoted to conclusions and discussion of extensions to this methodology. The Appendix provides general equilibrium results of the effects of multilateral trade liberalization and cost-effective environmental policy on welfare and environmental quality.
II. International Trade in Pollution Services
In the context of international trade, linkages between economic activity and the environment become more complex. This is especially the case when trade in goods and embodied pollution services are seen as dual to each other. Conventional notions of national welfare can be overturned, for example. A trade surplus might correspond to domestic pollution retention on behalf of millions of foreign consumers, while a deficit 1 Under a somewhat different context, Hayami (2000) proposes that developed countries should provide financial assistance to developing countries which implement anti-pollution policies.
Having both found that developing countries' participation in achieving a given CO 2 abatement target would lead to global efficiency gains and substantial reductions in abatement costs for the industrialized countries, the OECD (1995) and Coppel and Lee (1996) also recommend transfer payments to developing countries to encourage participation.
might arise from imports of environmentally risky goods produced elsewhere.
2 Thus simple mercantilist notions of export promotion seem environmentally retrograde while excessive import dependence might be promoted by green interests. Of course these ideas are still subject to the usual fallacies, both in terms of inconsistent behavioral aggregation and negative environmental externalities.
Although many economic activities occasion some negative environmental consequences through the uses of exhaustible resources and/or emissions of pollution, the net effect of trade on the domestic environment depends upon the composition of trade and the pollution intensity of the goods under consideration. Thus a country can have a trade surplus or deficit and, depending upon the composition of imports and exports, a surplus or deficit in services arising from domestically retained pollution or other environmental degradation. In this context, a winning country would be one that sustains a trade surplus and a pollution service deficit, accumulating net income from abroad while deferring more pollution to its trading partners that it retains at home. As we shall see in this section, Japan is just such a country.
To better understand the situation of Japan in this context, it is useful to review detailed patterns of its bilateral trade. 
 
Because of the data constraint, we relied exclusively on pollution coefficients for the United States, thereby assuming that Japan and all its trading partners were using the same production technologies, i.e.,
The pollution coefficients in question are given in Table 2 . < Insert Table 2 here > 3 See Hettige et al. (1994) .
While this approach simplified the present estimations, the likely result is that environmental asymmetries have been underestimated. This is to be expected because many Japanese technologies are significantly less pollution-intensive than those of its developing-country trading partners. While such an approach cannot yield the most precise quantitative results, the qualitative support for our conclusions would in most cases be even stronger if country-specific pollution coefficients were used. Table 3 here > The patterns of embodied effluent trade, depending as they do on the composition of trade and the pollution-intensity of individual activities, are quite complex and not amenable to easy generalization. For example, all four combinations of surplus and deficit for the two types of trade are in evidence. Japan has a trade surplus with the United States and industrial Europe, but a pollution deficit. This is the win-win scenario alluded to above, environmental mercantilism, where a country accumulates net foreign assets while its trading partners accumulate net environmental degradation.
With respect to Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, a different pattern emerges.
Japan has a deficit in commodity trade with this group for the period 1991-95. At the same time, however, they also have a deficit in pollution services. The reason for this is that, despite significant exports of manufactured goods, imports of natural resources from these three countries are much more pollution-intensive. 4 Thus these trading partners, at the national level at least, are renting their environmental assets in exchange for Japanese savings inflows.
With respect to China, Japan evinces a trade surplus in both goods and pollution services. This is largely because of China's current heavy dependence on heavy industry and capital-goods imports. Unlike other Asian trading partners, China provides relatively little to Japan in the way of pollution-intensive natural resources. Recently, Japan has increased imports of Chinese light industrial products, but these are relatively low pollution activities. In this way, Japan is renting its environmental assets while it is accumulating direct investment stocks in China. This result, however, is one that might well be contradicted in two ways. Firstly, the use of U.S. coefficients for China probably underestimated the pollution-intensity of its exports and this could reverse the balances in Table 3 . Secondly, it is reasonable to expect that Chinese exports to Japan will shift to more heavy industry over time, and thus greater pollution-intensity, again reversing the bilateral balance of trade in embodied effluents.
The situation for Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore appears analogous to China at first sight, but different forces are at work here. All three of these countries are quite advanced, and their exports to Japan are less pollution-intensive than natural resources emanating from developing countries. Thus these three appear to be enjoying a net transfer of pollution to Japan, at the expense of individual trade deficits. The former estimate, however, could be reversed if export industries in any of the three were sufficiently dirtier than their counterparts in the United States.
Indonesia and Other ASEAN economies (Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines) represent an especially important group.
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From the perspective of commodity trade, the two trading partners differ, i.e., Indonesia enjoys a trade surplus with Japan while Other ASEAN has a bilateral deficit. On the other hand, both countries are creating vastly more pollution at home on behalf of Japanese consumers than arises in Japanese production for exports to these countries. The reason for this is not difficult to ascertain -despite significant demand for Japanese manufactures in both regions, exports by them of natural resources are much more pollution-intensive. We shall have more to say about these important trading partners in the next section.
The last two trading partners represented are the Middle East and a Rest-of-World composite residual group. The former consists, from a Japanese trade perspective, mainly of energy exporters and this leads to predictable outcomes in both contexts. Japan is exceptionally import dependent in energy, and this leads to big trade deficits but also to a lot of deferred domestic pollution problems. The Rest-of-World group consists mainly of primary-dependent developing countries, and its balances behave accordinglycommodity surplus and pollution service deficit for Japan.
Perhaps most telling among the estimates presented are the world totals. Here we see the win-win strategy of environmental mercantilism in high relief. Japan's legendary trade surplus is clearly in evidence, yielding equally legendary net capital outflows to the rest of the world. The corresponding deficit in pollution service trade is not so well known, but it is an inevitable consequence of the existing patterns of specialization. The figures at the bottom of Table 3 thousand tons of toxic pollutants in other countries. In light of these results, it is reasonable to ask if there are incentive-compatible policies that could mitigate these effects.
III. A Collaborative Agenda for Japanese Foreign Direct Investment
How does today's global trade regime deal with environmental inequality of the type observed above? It is most obviously dealt by market forces, but these are as imperfect as many domestic markets for environmental amenities and commons. It is sufficiently difficult to achieve market valuation of these goods and services even in the most advanced economies, so there is little hope in the near future for implicit international market coordination that might equalize domestic resource costs. 6 Another approach has been more interventionist, the stipulation of explicit environmental standards or conditionality in trade agreements.
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While this approach gives clear voice to environmental interests, it is not congruent with conventional understanding of market forces and is likely to lead to greater inefficiency and unforeseen welfare costs.
realities. One of these is economic hierarchy, which is essentially the sequence of individual economies in a historical continuum of economic development.
The situation portrayed in the previous section for Indonesia, Other ASEAN economies, and probably China (given more accurate data) represents a dilemma familiar to most developing countries. When embarking on the road to modernization, one must often barter resources, and even environmental amenities, in exchange for the imported implements of industrialization and modern consumerism. To ignore these facts in multilateral policy dialogue is not only paternalistic, but it threatens to impose debilitating distortions on already struggling economies.
While such a growth-environment tradeoff might seem an inevitable result of international economic hierarchy, the extent of environmental damage it occasions is by no means inevitable. Although most developing countries want to experience industrialization, there is no need to experience the same environmental damage that occurred in the last two centuries of Western industrialization. Better technologies can reduce the rate of environmental degradation along any given growth path, and new patterns of industrialization (i.e. information technology) may be greener than their precursors.
Better technologies are also marketable exports for the more advanced countries, and herein lies the potential for a market-based, incentive compatible reconciliation of growth and environmental objectives. Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the developing countries to adopt cleaner technology, but this will contribute to increased efficiency and greater environmental sustainability. Thus it should not be difficult to make a case for trade and investment in these more advanced techniques and, given the kind of environmental inequities observed above, it is reasonable to expect countries like Japan to take the lead in this regard.
We suggest two ways for pollution debtors, like Japan, to facilitate global environmental mitigation. The first is simple export promotion, with special emphasis on innovative sectors that are leaders in producing clean technology. The second is more indirect, but probably more important in the long run. In dollar terms, Japan is now the world's largest player in ODA and one of the leaders in FDI. Both activities have an important influence on recipient-country technology adoption, and the Japanese government can advance its more innovative sectors by promoting technology transfer in both contexts. In the long run, this will not only enhance the Japan's stature as a trading partner, but promote innovation and exports. 
IV. Conclusions and Extensions
When seen from the perspective of trade in embodied pollution services, a new relationship emerges between market forces and global environmental conditions.
Depending upon their domestic technologies and patterns of import and export concentration, countries can be net importers or exporters of pollution services.
Examination of detailed trade data, with reference to the pollution intensity of production for the tradables, reveals an elaborate and quite asymmetric system of induced pollution transfers.
In this paper, we have examined the effluent content of Japan's bilateral trade and find it to be a significant debtor country in terms of global pollution. Our estimates 9 Formally, this can be modeled by treating emissions per unit of output endogenously; e.g., indicate that, despite its perennial trade surplus, Japanese consumers confer net transfers of thousands of tons of toxic pollutants onto the country's trading partners. This is especially the case for developing and developed natural resource exporters, including countries as different as Indonesia and the United States. Japan has made significant progress with domestic environmental improvement over the last few decades, but our estimates indicate that its net consumption habits are still imposing heavy environmental burdens elsewhere in the world.
Thus Japan and other environmental debtor nations have a special responsibility to foster pollution mitigation internationally, and there may be no better way to do this than to promote technology transfer within the framework of their (extensive) FDI and ODA programs. Such an approach, much less ad hoc than negotiated environmental standards, would improve economic welfare in both recipient and donor countries, while setting a progressive example for collaborative reconciliation of growth and environmental objectives.
There are four main directions in which we would like to see this work extended.
First, we believe this a very rich area for theoretical research. The environmental content of trade has only begun to be understood, and many of the tools used to understand other implicit trade (e.g. factor content) remain to be applied and could be quite enlightening.
Beyond this, the subtle interplay of commodity, resource, and "environmental" markets at both the domestic and international level is only just now being examined seriously and is very inviting. Problems of incomplete markets are difficult enough in the domestic context, but their implications for multilateral trade and comparative advantage are far more complex. Finally, more rigorous comparative domestic environmental analysis may ultimately yield the tools needed for a better understanding of global commons.
A second important area for more work is on environmental data. To more clearly delineate patterns of global environmental inequality and to ultimately measure the opportunity cost of more homogeneous technologies, country-specific emissions data are essential. Fortunately, the Economics of Industrial Pollution Control Project at the World Bank, which produced the emission data used in this paper, has also obtained estimates for a few other countries, and this database is growing gradually. It would be useful for any country to more clearly understand the environmental dimension of its bilateral trade relations.
Third, it would be useful to move our empirical approach beyond static share tabulations to a more sophisticated simulation framework. Such an approach, typified by calibrated general equilibrium (CGE) models, would enable us to appraise the costs and benefits of alternative policy responses to the issues raised here. Preliminary results from a ten-country CGE model are reported in the Appendix, but we have not yet incorporated several important features into the model.
Finally, an idea of the type put forth here will ultimately be of limited interest unless it is incorporated into the domestic and international policy agenda. By fostering a new way of looking at the environmental incidence of trade, we hope to stimulate policy dialogue. By advocating linkage between FDI, ODA, and technology transfer, we hope to facilitate a collaborative approach to reconciling two modern aspirations, economic growth and a better environment. Lee and Roland-Holst (1995, 1997b) for a complete set of equations describing the model.
Since we used the Institute of Developing Economies' ten-country input-output table (IDE, 1992) as the principal data source, the present model does not include Canada, Australia and New Zealand, EU-12, or the Middle East. It should be also noted that Hong Kong is excluded from China as its input-output table is not provided in IDE (1992) . Furthermore, foreign direct investment and technology transfer are not explicitly modeled here.
would bring about welfare gains in all PAC-10 countries, measured by Hicksian equivalent variations (EV). China, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand experience welfare gains of more than one percent while Japan, the United States, Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia experience relatively small gains. 
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Large variations in these two effects across countries lead to large differences in the resulting changes in emission levels. Overall, increases in emissions are relatively large on most of the pollutants in Singapore and Malaysia largely because of the substantial expansion of output in at least one pollution-intensive industry. Specifically, the energy and mineral sector (mostly refined petroleum) in Singapore and metal and chemical and paper sectors in Malaysia expand their production significantly. Across pollutants, the increase in emissions of total suspended solids (TSS) are relatively large in Malaysia (13.5%), the Philippines (10.7%), and Thailand (5.1%), which is strongly associated with a sharp increase in output of the metal sector.
In Japan emissions of the two water pollutants (BOD: biochemical oxygen demand and TSS) increase slightly, whereas emissions of five air pollutants (particulates, SO 2 , NO 2 , CO, and VOC: volatile organic compounds) all decrease. Emissions of every 11 While the United States incurs a small loss in real GDP (0.06 percent), it is more than offset by an improvement in its terms of trade, resulting in a 0.1 percent gain in welfare.
12 Another important factor is a "technical" effect in abatement; i.e., a reduction of pollution achieved by changing the input and factor mix to produce the same good (Copeland and Taylor, 1994) , which will be incorporated in a later version. A limitation of the present model is that there is no scope for technical substitution within sectors, and thus emissions are proportional to output regardless of relative prices and differential effluent taxes. pollutant decline in the United States because the expanding sectors (i.e., agriculture, food products, transport equipment, and services) are all relatively clean while some of the declining sectors (i.e., chemicals and paper, metal) are relatively dirty. In China emissions of all seven pollutants increase modestly. Table A .2 summarizes absolute changes in the effluent content of Japanese exports and imports resulting from experiment 1 (i.e., multilateral tariff liberalization). The results indicate a pattern in which the effluent content of Japanese exports is significantly lower than that of its imports in trade with China and ASEAN countries. In spite of using the same emission intensity for each pollutant in all countries, the size of net embodied effluent trade is quite large in Japan's trade with Indonesia, Malaysia, China, and Singapore.
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By contrast, Japanese exports embody more effluent loads than its imports from Korea and Taiwan in all pollution categories. For all pollutants except TSS, the amount of pollution emitted from goods produced in Japan that are exported is less than that emitted from goods produced in the trade partners' territory that are exported to Japan (the last column of Table A .2). < Insert Table A. 2 here > For a number of East Asian countries the effects of trade liberalization on emission levels lead to the policy challenge of addressing the environmental consequences of tradebased economic growth. In the second experiment, a uniform effluent tax is levied in each country with the exception of the United States to mitigate a particular pollutant to achieve a given abatement target. We employ a uniform effluent tax because it is more cost-13 Since the U.S. effluent coefficients are applied to all countries, differing levels of technology and environmental regulations between Japan and its trading partners do not affect our results. If country-specific data were available, the results would have yielded even larger asymmetries. There are significant technological disparities across countries in a variety of industrial activities, and environmental regulations in Japan and the United States are more stringent than in other economies.
effective than other forms of taxes (Lee and Roland-Holst, 1997a,b). 14 Under this scheme each sector would abate emissions until the marginal abatement cost is equal to the uniform tax rate. In each country, we selected the pollutant that showed the largest percentage increase in emissions induced by tariff liberalization. In addition, the abatement target is chosen to just offset the magnitude of increase in emissions. Accordingly, the targets are set as follows: 1%, 4%, 6%, 11%, and 14% reductions in TSS emissions for Japan, Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia, respectively; 2%, 4%, and 10% reductions in NO 2 for China, Indonesia, and Singapore, respectively; and 1% reduction in VOC for Taiwan.
The results of achieving the curtailment targets by uniform effluent taxes are presented in Table A Singapore incurs a 0.6 percent loss in real GDP, its terms of trade improves sufficiently to result in a 0.6 percent gain in welfare. Second, Malaysia's real GDP increases slightly despite the imposition of effluent tax because a large output contraction in the metal sector is more than offset by output expansion in other manufacturing sectors.
< Insert Table A.3 here > 14 A system of tradable emission permits is an alternative cost-effective instrument to a uniform tax, but may be more difficult to implement in developing countries. 15 The only exception is BOD in Malaysia. 16 The present model does not incorporate the benefits of reduced pollution in the utility function or EV calculation, but their inclusion should increase the social welfare level for a small effluent tax.
In the final experiment, the same uniform tax scheme implemented in the second experiment is combined with multilateral tariff liberalization. This experiment is conducted to illustrate a critical point that the combination of trade liberalization and a cost-effective emission abatement instrument can lead to both an improvement in welfare and a reduction in pollution. The results are presented in Table A In Malaysia, Korea, and Taiwan, however, setting abatement target for one pollutant was not adequate to reduce some other pollutants sufficiently to offset pollution generated by trade liberalization. For other countries, the benefits of tariff removal are greater than the cost of cutting pollution by the magnitude which more than counterbalances pollution brought about by tariff removals. 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 United 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1981-85 1986-90 1991- 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1981-85 1986-90 1991- 200 -5,747 -21,012 -6,890 -15,947 5,807 -3,951 -85,984 China (including Hong Kong) 279 -52,951 -197,547 -117,350 -95,721 -55,656 -1,223 -14,223 -43,824 -157,550 -62,679 -91,254 -13,314 -4,268 -320,535 World Total Note: For each country except the United States, a uniform effluent tax is levied to achieve a given abatement target: Japan -1% in TSS, China -2% in NO 2 , Korea -4% in TSS, Taiwan -1% in VOC, Singapore -10% in NO 2 , Malaysia -14% in TSS, Thailand -6% in TSS, Indonesia -4% in NO 2 , and the Philippines -11% in TSS. 
